Defimon detects DeFi attacks across major chains from the early steps and streams them as structured JSON over WebSocket. Built for DeFi incident response.
deploy
The attacker's contract lands
suspicious_contract_deployed
tier=tornado_direct · deployer nonce=0
T+3
AI triage detects the victim
confirmed_exploit
WebSocket
T+?
The drain that could be avoided
confirmed_attack
WebSocket + Defimon Signals
Streaming from
how it works
One API key opens both streams on every chain we cover. Each detection arrives as a single JSON object, ready for your own automation.
Open a WebSocket to the feed with your API key. One key works for both streams across all major chains.
Receive every detected attack as a single JSON object the instant it's found — or subscribe to the curated, LLM-confirmed stream for lower noise.
Parse the payload and route it into your own systems — hedge a position, snapshot state, page on-call, or trigger a circuit breaker.
const ws = new WebSocket(
"wss://ws.defimon.xyz/ws/attacks?api_key=YOUR_API_KEY"
);
ws.onmessage = (event) => {
const attack = JSON.parse(event.data);
// Machine-readable: act on it however you like
if (attack.balance_change > 100_000) {
hedge(attack.victim_address, attack.network);
}
};the payload
Two streams, one schema. The confirmed stream is a strict superset of the raw one, so the same parser handles both.
Raw, real-time. Fires the instant a suspicious transaction is detected — fully enriched with the victim protocol, TVL, and per-address balance changes.
Read the full payload referencewhy teams wire it in
Each one maps to a field in the payload, so you can check it against the stream yourself.
Attacker contracts and malicious governance proposals are flagged the moment they land on-chain — before the drain.
suspicious_contract_deployed
Every payload carries the victim protocol, TVL, token symbols, and per-address USD balance changes. No extra lookups required.
protocols.balance_changes[]
The raw stream fires instantly. A curated second stream drops MEV and arbitrage false positives and attaches a written explanation.
llm_explanation
featured by quicknode
Defimon runs on QuickNode Streams — told by our infrastructure provider.

case study
How Defimon cut block-to-detection latency 4x on QuickNode Streams while expanding coverage across chains.
Read on QuickNode
engineering deep dive
Our CTO walks through the pipeline behind the feed: push-based Streams with JavaScript filters at the node level, and millions of tracked addresses in a Key-Value Store.
Read on QuickNodepricing
From a free public channel to a real-time machine-readable feed.
for enthusiasts
Public Telegram channel
No account needed.
for traders
Premium Telegram channel
Prefer Telegram? The WebSocket feed can also be paid for with Telegram Stars.
Open the subscription botthe alternatives
Designed for DeFi protocol teams and incident response.
| Feature | Defimon WebSocket | Any public source such as X | Build your own |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-drain detection | |||
| Detection latency | sub-second | Up to ~24h delay | Varies — high effort |
| Machine-readable JSON | |||
| LLM-confirmed streams | Exploits + pre-drain | ||
| Protocol & TVL enrichment | Partial | ||
| Per-address balance changes | |||
| Networks covered | Major chains | Major chains | Per-chain infra |
| Maintenance burden | None | None | Constant |
| Cost | $200 / mo | Free | $$$ infra + eng |
incident reports
Root-cause write-ups of the incidents the feed watches for.
Liquid Network $320M Range-Proof Cache ExploitA range-proof verification cache bug in Elements let an attacker mint unbacked L-BTC and peg roughly 3,996 BTC (about $320M) out of Blockstream's Liquid Network, draining 95% of the reserve. The self-described white hat returned 3,400 BTC and kept 598.5 BTC.Bitcoin−$320M
Term Finance $8.5M Governance TakeoverTerm Finance's vault DAOs had empty electorates, so $25 of deposits bought 100% of the vote in five vaults. The attacker self-approved proposals, zeroed a 7-day delay and drained 2,841.74 WETH and 1,679,639 USDC.Ethereum−$8.47M
The Sandbox SAND Delegate Hijack and Unbacked MintThe SAND OFT's own approveAndCall let an attacker name themselves LayerZero delegate, forge inbound verification, mint 329 trillion unbacked SAND on Base and empty the Ethereum adapter.Base−$1.02M
Maya Protocol Six-Bug Trade Account ExploitAn attacker chained six MAYAChain bugs so a false theft alert paid an uncapped 49.45M CACAO subsidy into a pool holding 0.11 LINK, then took 99.93% of it and withdrew 48.87M CACAO.MAYAChain−$1.36MDefimon detects exploits on major chains before they execute and streams them to you: human-readable alerts in Telegram, or structured JSON over WebSocket for your own systems.
websocket $200 / mo · signals $50 / mo · channel free